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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ROBERT NEMETH, JR., United States, ex rel., 




OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY; ERIC S. 
HAUSMAN, Individually and Severally; LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN A. 
VARANO PC; OFFICE OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY SHERIFF; PAUL INNES, 
Individually and Severally; MILDRED SCOTT, Individually and Severally; MICHELLE 
M. SMITH, Individually and Severally; DOES 1-10; ROES 1-10 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-16809) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 2, 2020 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, PHIPPS and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Pro se appellant Robert Nemeth, Jr., appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 
complaint, in which he raised various claims related to a state court foreclosure action.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 Nemeth’s complaint stems from the foreclosure of a property he owned in Monroe 
Township, New Jersey.  Wells Fargo Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings on the 
property against Nemeth and three others in New Jersey state court in 2012.  In May 
2015, Judge Paul Innes of the Chancery Division of the Mercer County Superior Court 
ultimately entered a final judgment of foreclosure for over $370,000 after summary 
judgment was granted in favor of Wells Fargo Bank.  The property was authorized to be 
sold at a sheriff’s sale after a writ of execution was filed in the Chancery Division of the 
Middlesex County Superior Court.  The writ of execution was signed by Michelle M. 
Smith, the Clerk of the Superior Court, and states that it was witnessed by Judge Innes. 
 After Nemeth unsuccessfully appealed the foreclosure decision, see Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A. v. Nemeth, No. A-0928-15T3, 2017 WL 2920417, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. July 10, 2017) (per curiam), the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale for $100 in 
April 2019 to MTGLQ Investors, L.P.  The Middlesex County Sheriff, Mildred Scott, 
executed a sheriff’s deed of foreclosure in May 2019.  The Law Offices of Steven A. 
Varano, P.C., and Eric S. Hausman, an attorney at that firm, represented MTGLQ 
Investors in securing a writ of possession to enforce the partnership’s right to the 
property.  In June 2019, Smith signed a writ of possession to the property to Wells Fargo 




was witnessed by a New Brunswick Superior Court judge who is not a party to this 
proceeding.  Nemeth alleges that he was served with the writ of possession and a notice 
of eviction in July 2019. 
 Nemeth subsequently filed a complaint in the District Court in August 2019, 
naming the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Smith, Judge Innes, 
the Office of the Middlesex County Sheriff, Scott, the Law Offices of Stephen A. Varano, 
Hausman, and various unnamed individuals as defendants.  The named defendants all 
moved to dismiss Nemeth’s claims, and the District Court granted their motions, 
dismissing Nemeth’s complaint with prejudice.  Nemeth timely appealed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Nemeth’s claims.2  See Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  Dismissal is appropriate “if, 
 
1  Nemeth named twenty unidentified “Doe” and “Roe” defendants in his complaint who 
were never served with process.  Because these defendants were never served, they were 
never parties to the case within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  
See Gomez v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 882 F.2d 733, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976).  Accordingly, the District 
Court’s order is final and appealable, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal.  See 
Gomez, 882 F.2d at 735-36. 
 
2  In our review, we consider the complaint, any “document integral to or explicitly relied 
upon” in framing the complaint, see Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(internal citation omitted), and any “undisputedly authentic document that a defendant 
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the 
document,” see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 





accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial 
plausibility.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).  
III. 
 We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Nemeth’s complaint with 
prejudice.3  First, the District Court properly determined that the Office of the Clerk of 
the Superior Court was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity on 
Nemeth’s claims against it.  Eleventh Amendment immunity protects a state or a state 
agency from suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity or the 
state has waived its immunity.  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89, 100 (1984); Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 513 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Fitchik v. 
N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989) (“A state agency is 
entitled to immunity from suit in a federal court under the eleventh amendment when a 
judgment against it would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a 
 
3  As the District Court noted, Nemeth’s claims are not a model of clarity, but we agree 
with the District Court’s construction of Nemeth’s complaint as seeking to bring various 
constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Nemeth has argued that he “has an 
absolute right to select the law of the complaint, which is very specific as to Public Law 
39-26,” rather than § 1983.  See Appellant’s Br. at p. 49; see also Compl. at p. 9.  “Public 
Law 39-26” appears to refer to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which has been revised 
since its enactment and is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82.  See Georgia v. 
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 789, n.12 (1966).  Because Nemeth has made no allegations that 
could possibly state a cause of action under §§ 1981-82, the District Court properly 
proceeded to analyze his claims under § 1983, which permits individuals to bring actions 
for violations of their civil rights by state actors.  See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 
371 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004).  Nemeth’s continued insistence on appeal that he 




judgment against the State itself.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court is a component of a state court, established by 
the New Jersey Constitution in a unified state-based court system, see N.J. Const. Art. VI, 
§ 7, ¶ 3, and is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as an “arm” of the 
state.  See Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing the 
factors for “whether an entity is an arm of the state and, therefore, entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity” and describing the “unification of the New Jersey court system”); 
cf. Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity as “part of the unified judicial system subject to the control of the Supreme 
Court”). 
Nemeth has identified no waiver of immunity here, and his citation to 
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) — a provision which regulates tribal gaming ordinances — 
has no relevance to whether Congress intended to abrogate New Jersey’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in the context of this case.  Nemeth also has not identified any 
“prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an officer’s future conduct” that 
could permit immunity to be waived under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.  See MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 506 (3d Cir. 2001).  Rather, 
although Nemeth claims that he seeks injunctive relief, in actuality, he seeks retrospective 
relief in the form of a decree that the state court judgments related to his foreclosure are 
unconstitutional.  See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 




allegations target past conduct, and the . . . [litigant’s requested] remedy is not intended 
to halt a present, continuing violation of federal law”). 
 Next, the District Court properly concluded that Judge Innes is entitled to absolute 
judicial immunity in this case.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978) 
(explaining that judges are not civilly liable for judicial acts); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 
F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).  Absolute judicial “immunity is overcome in 
only two sets of circumstances,” either “for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in 
the judge’s judicial capacity,” or “for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the 
complete absence of all jurisdiction.”  Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per 
curiam). 
Nemeth argues that Judge Innes acted beyond the scope of his jurisdiction in 
entering a final judgment of foreclosure in his case.  However, as the District Court 
explained, Nemeth made no allegations that Judge Innes took any nonjudicial actions or 
any actions “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,” as Nemeth specifically 
challenges the actions Judge Innes took in ruling on his foreclosure matter, a matter 
within the scope of the Superior Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  See Figueroa v. 
Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a] judge will not be 
deprived of immunity because the action he took is in error, was done maliciously, or was 
in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in 
the clear absence of all jurisdiction” and that “[g]enerally, . . .where a court has some 
subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes”) 




 Relatedly, for Nemeth’s claims against Smith for signing facially valid writs of 
execution and possession related to the foreclosure of his property, she is also entitled to 
absolute quasi-judicial immunity for her actions taken in her capacity as the Clerk of the 
Superior Court.  See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(providing absolutely quasi-judicial immunity for court administrative personnel who are 
charged with carrying out facially valid court orders when a suit challenges the order). 
Both the Office of the Middlesex County Sheriff and Scott are also entitled to 
absolute quasi-judicial immunity for executing the facially valid deed of foreclosure 
challenged by Nemeth.  “In determining whether a government actor was fulfill[ing] a 
quasi-judicial role at the court’s request, we take a functional approach to immunity” in 
which “we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of 
officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to 
particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those 
functions.”  Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  Although Nemeth alleged in his complaint that “the sheriff 
and/or her representative intentionally prevented the participation in a bidding process by 
anyone in the room full of bidders,” see Compl. at p. 14, this conclusory statement is 
insufficient to allege that these defendants were not acting to lawfully execute an 
authorized order. 4  See Russell, 905 F.3d at 248. 
 
4  Nemeth insists in his appellate filings that his vague allegations warranted discovery, 
which would have proved “bid-rigging.”  See Appellant’s Br. at p. 43.  Although Nemeth 
has repeatedly claimed that he personally witnessed “bid-rigging” at the sheriff’s sale of 




Nemeth’s constitutional claims against the Law Offices of Stephen A. Varano and 
Hausman were also properly dismissed because nothing in Nemeth’s complaint suggests 
that either defendant is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.5  See Benn v. Universal 
Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant 
Nemeth leave to amend his complaint; amendment would be futile under the 
circumstances of this case.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Although Nemeth contests the dismissal of his claims, he has not provided 
additional specific factual allegations in any of his appellate filings to suggest that his 
claims should proceed. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
buyers attempted to bid on the property or how these alleged buyers were prevented from 
doing so.  See id.  In particular, Nemeth did not specifically allege how the Office of the 
Middlesex County Sheriff or Scott interfered in any way with the execution of the deed 
of foreclosure. 
 
5  Additionally, because all of the defendants named by Nemeth were state and private 
officials and entities, the District Court properly concluded that Nemeth cannot pursue a 
Fifth Amendment claim against any defendant, as the Due Process Clause under the Fifth 
Amendment protects against federal governmental actions, not state actions.  See Riley v. 
Camp, 130 F.3d 958, 972 n. 19 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam). 
